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STUDENT NOTE
CLOSING PANDORA'S BOX: ENVIRONMENTAL-QUALITY
INSURANCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
BROADENING CERCLA LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
More than 26,000 abandoned and operational hazardous waste
sites have been discovered in the United States during the last dec-
ade. 1 In response to growing public concern over the environmental
and public health hazards posed by the improper disposal of hazard-
ous wastes, 2 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).3
The 1980 CERCLA legislation established a $1.6 billion
"Superfund" to effect immediate remedial action upon the nation's
worst sites.4 CERCLA authorizes the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to order responsible parties to cleanup the
hazardous waste site 5 or, at the EPA's discretion, to cleanup the site
itself.6 The EPA is then permitted to seek reimbursement from spe-
cific "responsible parties" 7 held to be strictly liable under the stat-
1. McGowin, Environmental Liability for Vendees and Lenders, 49 ALA. LAw. 264, 266
(Sept. 1988) (these sites are listed by the Environmental Protection Agency for fur-
ther action or investigation).
2. Public concern over the hazardous waste problem escalated in 1978 with the
environmental nightmare at Love Canal in upstate New York. See 11 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 139, 143 (May 30, 1980). After the area's inhabitants reported a high inci-
dence of health problems ranging from nosebleeds to birth defects, it was discovered
that their neighborhood had been developed above an abandoned hazardous waste
site. Mervak v. City of Niagara Falls, 101 Misc. 2d 68, 420 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (1979).
The long-buried chemicals had contaminated the water supply and were seeping to
the surface near the homes. Id. Love Canal was a driving force behind the future
environmental legislation.
3. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. Id. § 9611. This section details the authorized uses of the Hazardous Sub-
stance Superfund. See McGowin, supra note 1, at 266. The EPA has placed more than
800 of the country's most destructive hazardous waste sites on a "National Priorities
List." Id. Inclusion on this environmental docket qualifies the site for federal funds
and a more comprehensive investigation under close EPA supervision.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (authorizing President to order
removal consistent with the national contingency plan found in § 9605).
6. Id. § 9604(a)(1).
7. CERCLA lists four categories of parties potentially responsible for the
cleanup of hazardous waste. Id. § 9607. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text
(defining CERCLA's responsible party categories); see also Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v.
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ute.8 After CERCLA's enactment, however, it became apparent that
the number of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites was much larger
than originally anticipated in 1980.9 Much to the dismay of a well
intentioned Congress, the Superfund coffers were quickly depleted
primarily through efforts aimed at identifying and assessing the haz-
ardous waste problem.1O
CERCLA was amended in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA).l The amendments provided
CERCLA with an additional $8.5 billion to be used over a five year
period.12 SARA's legislative history suggests that, in replenishing
Superfund, Congress was aware that the EPA would not have ade-
Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 130, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232
(1984) (discussing three categories of "responsible persons" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607).
8. Although CERCLA does not specifically mention the strict liability standard,
section 101 does state that liability shall be construed using the same standard as set
forth in the Clean Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1988) (the owner or operator of a vessel
from which oil or hazardous substances is discharged in violation of § 1321(b)(3)
shall be liable to the government for the actual cost of the cleanup). Courts have
therefore consistently interpreted CERCLA section 101 liability as strict liability. See,
e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726, 731-32 (8th Cir.
1986); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1094 (D. Ariz. 1984),
aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
9. In 1980, the EPA estimated that there were approximately 400 hazardous
waste sites requiring a total clean up cost of $1.6 billion. The agency initially antici-
pated a relatively simple cleanup process involving the removal of a few inches of
contaminated top soil. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2835, 2836.
In 1985, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment placed the number
of sites at 10,000 and estimated a 50 year cleanup time at a cost of $100 billion. See
Superfund Strategy, 9 CHEM. & RADIATION WAsTE LITIGATION REP. 752 (1985).
In 1986, the EPA's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), which records and tracks hazardous
waste sites, listed about 23,000 sites eligible for remediable action. See Atkeson,
Goldberg, Elrod & Connors, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10363, 10369
n.146 (1986).
In 1987, a United States General Accounting Office report suggested that a
more comprehensive estimate could raise the total number of hazardous waste sites
to about 368,000 sites nationwide. See Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre: Unprecedented Liability
for Landowners, 73 A.B.A. J. 66, 67 (Nov. 1987).
10. See McGowin, supra note 1, at 266.
11. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as part of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The term "Superfund" will be used through-
out this discussion to refer to CERCLA as amended by SARA.
12. Id. § 9611. The additional funding for Superfund was provided by the
Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-517 (1986). See Atkeson,
Goldberg, Elrod & Connors, supra note 9, at 10413 (explaining the Superfund financ-
1042 [Vol. 16
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quate resources to cleanup all of the known hazardous waste sites.tS
The EPA therefore has become the focus of sustained pressure by
Congress to vigorously pursue cleanup reimbursement from respon-
sible parties.14 The judiciary has cooperated by broadening its view
of CERCIA liability and increasingly placing the financial burden of
reimbursement and cleanup on parties which possess more extensive
economic resources.15 As a result, almost anyone even remotely as-
sociated with contaminated real estate bears some risk of incurring
CERCLA liability.
The Superfund legislation has created more problems than it has
resolved.16 Although the environment has enjoyed some degree of
recuperative success under CERCLA, legislative efforts to finance
Superfund have failed. Moreover, the courts' "witch-hunt" ap-
proach to CERCLA liability continues to endanger the vitality of the
real estate and banking industries.t7 CERCLA was a good first step
in an overall remedial program, but it is not a panacea. If Superfund
is to continue, modifications must be made to adequately finance the
program and minimize its negative impact on collateral industries.
This note will focus on the deficiencies inherent in the current en-
ing provisions). See also 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (providing for the
use of the Hazardous Substance Superfund).
13. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2837 (the House report noted that the "resources given
to EPA were simply inadequate to fulfill the promises that were made to clean up
abandoned hazardous wastes in this country.... EPA was virtually guaranteed to fail
from the moment CERCLA passed in 1980.").
14. See, e.g., Lucero, EPA's Role in and Perspectives on Property Transfer and Financing
Liabilities, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10366, 10366 (1988); Baldwin, Hazardous
Waste Problems-Implicationsfor Developers, The Daily Record, Nov. 20, 1985, at 3, col. 1
(part I) and Nov. 21, 1985, at 3, col. 1 (part II).
15. While generators, owners, operators, and transporters have traditionally
been included, cases are now holding others liable. See, e.g., United States v. Caro-
lawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20698 (D.S.C. 1984) (holding that CER-
CLA liability can be imposed on a firm acting as a "conduit" in the transfer of title to
a waste disposal site even though the firm actually held title to the site for less than an
hour); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M.
1984) (holding that a lessor who leased a warehouse it owned to a business generat-
ing hazardous waste was liable under CERCLA as an "owner," even though the les-
sor had no other connection to the lessee's operations); United States v. South
Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577, 1578 (D.S.C.
1984) (holding that a lessee who sublet a portion of its leasehold to a separate corpo-
ration conducting a waste disposal operation was liable under CERCLA as an
"owner").
16. See generally Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV.
ENvLr. L. REV. 385 (1988). This article examines the legislative history of CERCLA
and SARA and outlines the elements necessary to state a claim under the Acts. The
author then reviews the viability of defenses under Superfund and concludes that a
defendant has few methods in which to limit liability.
17. Id. at 386. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
1990]
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vironmental legislation. Part I will review CERCLA and the SARA
amendments.8 Part II will discuss the problem of financing
Superfund and the impact of CERCLA liability on the real estate and
banking industries and on the court system.19 The environmental
consultant plays a critical role in CERCLA's innocent landowner de-
fense. Part II will also examine the potential future liability of the
environmental consultant.20 Finally, part III will propose an alterna-
tive solution to broadening CERCLA liability: the creation of envi-
ronmental-quality insurance. 2 1
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 as a congressional answer to the
environmental and public health hazards posed by the improper dis-
posal of hazardous wastes. 22 CERCLA was meant to supplement the
existing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)23 and
other environmental law previously enacted to control the disposal
of hazardous waste materials.24 The Act empowers the federal gov-
18. See infra notes 22-89 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 106-60 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 161-221 and accompanying text.
22. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY-THE EVOLUTION OF SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVI-
RONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT 303 (1983).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), amended by Hazardous
Waste Management, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified in sections of 42
U.S.C. §§ 6921-6931, 6933 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
24. Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in
an effort to address the general problems posed by the increasing use and accumula-
tion of hazardous waste. The statute's primary objective is to regulate the on-going
generation, transportation, storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste. See
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120 (the RCRA provides what Congress has termed a "pro-
spective cradle-to-grave regulatory regime governing the movement of hazardous
waste in our society."). The RCRA authorizes the EPA to bring suit against any per-
son participating in such activity where the solid or hazardous waste may present an
"imminent and substantial endangerment" to the public health or environment. See
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1982).
The statute imposes waste management duties upon current generators and
transporters of hazardous waste and on the present owners and operators of hazard-
ous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. Under the RCRA, waste "gener-
ators" are required to follow rigid guidelines concerning the "identification, labeling,
tracking, and reporting of hazardous waste."
Transporters... must comply with the RCRA manifest system, meet certain
regulations regarding the storage of hazardous waste, and meet notice and
reporting requirements in the event of a spill during transportation. Own-
ers and operators are required to comply with detailed requirements regard-
[Vol. 16
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ernment, through the Environmental Protection Agency, to cleanup
abandoned and active hazardous waste sites through initiation of a
"response action."25
CERCLA provides the EPA with two types of response actions.
Section 104 authorizes the EPA to initiate a cleanup action very
quickly.26 First, the EPA must request responsible parties to remove
the hazardous waste materials from a site.27 If the responsible party
refuses to act, the EPA can use Superfund money to pay for the
cleanup and subsequently bring suit under CERCLA section 107 to
recover all costs. 28 Under a section 106 response action the EPA
requests a court order forcing the responsible party to cleanup waste
sites that pose an imminent and substantial danger to the environ-
ment or public health.29 A section 106 action is more economical
than a section 104 action, but the process is slow and often plagued
by administrative delays.3 O For this reason the EPA has relied pri-
ing (1) maintenance of records of the treatment, storage, or disposal of
hazardous waste, (2) the actual treatment, storing, and disposal of hazard-
ous waste pursuant to methods satisfactory to the EPA, (3) the location and
construction of disposal facilities, (4) the maintenance of a contingency plan
to minimize damage from hazardous waste, and (5) compliance with permit
regulations.
Killion, The Environmental Statutory Framework: An Overview of CERCLA, SARA, MERLA,
RCRA, and UST, 1, 16-21, Environmental Liability for Real Estate and Banking Attor-
neys (Minnesota Continuing Legal Education 1989). Whether RCRA could be used
to force the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites was the subject of some
disagreement among the courts. Id. at 17.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. V 1987). The EPA's response authority attaches
whenever (1) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of
such a release into the environment, or (2) any pollutant or contaminant is released
or there is a substantial threat of a release into the environment which may present
an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare. Id. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 300.61-300.71 (1989) (setting forth the actual procedures that must be followed
by the EPA when initiating a response action).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (Supp. V 1987). See Note, Developments in the Law---Toxic
Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1486 (1986) (discussing the criteria which
influence whether the EPA initiates a section 104 or section 106 response action).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6131.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The EPA response actions are
financed primarily from the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund established
by section 221 of CERCLA. Id. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, re-
printed in I SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-THE EVOLUTION OF SELECTED SEC-
TIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY ACT 303 (1983) (the purpose of Superfund is to finance response actions
"where a liable party refuses to cleanup, cannot be found, or cannot pay the costs of
cleanup and compensation"). See also Ohio v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 880
F.2d 432, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("In CERCLA as originally enacted, public trustees
could rely on Superfund money to pay for restoration in cases where they could not
recover money from the polluters themselves .
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982).
30. See Note, supra note 26, at 1486.
1990] 1045
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marily on the more costly section 104 response action.3 '
1. Elements of CERCLA Liability
Liability under CERCLA is triggered by a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance into the environment which causes
the EPA to incur response costs. 3 2 The Environmental Protection
Agency or other plaintiff can establish liability against a responsible
party if: (1) the site is a facility;33 (2) a release or threatened releaseS4
of any hazardous substance3 5 from the site has occurred; (3) the re-
lease or threatened release has caused the plaintiff to incur response
costs; 3 6 and (4) the defendant is one of the four classes of persons
31. Id.
32. In addition to the EPA, CERCIA specifically authorizes private parties, in-
cluding local governments to cleanup hazardous waste sites and seek reimbursement
from either the responsible party or the Superfund. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987); 42 U.S.C. § 9623(a) (1982).
33. A "facility" is defined in part as "any site or area where a hazardous sub-
stance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be
located." Id. at § 9601(9)(B). See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 836 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810
F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (contaminated farm held to be a "facility"); New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 n.15 (2d Cir. 1985) (CERCLA defines
"facility" broadly to include any property where hazardous substances are located);
United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (definition of "facility"
includes roadsides where hazardous waste was dumped); New York v. General Elec.
Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (a dragstrip held to constitute a "facil-
ity"); United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (D. Ariz.
1984) ("facility" includes real estate development containing toxic waste).
34. A "release" is defined as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Although CERCLA does not define "threatened release," courts have given the
term a broad reading. See New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.
1985) ("the corroding and deteriorating tanks, [defendant's] lack of expertise in han-
dling hazardous waste, and even the failure to license the facility amount to a threat
of release"); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 747 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) ("The evidence of the presence of hazardous substances at the facility,
when combined with the evidence of the unwillingness of any party to assert control
over the substances, amounts to a threat of release.").
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). CERCLA defines the term
"hazardous substance" as having the characteristics identified in the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (1982). See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 261.20 (1986) ("characteristically hazardous sub-
stances [include] those which have the characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, reac-
tivity and EP toxicity"). Petroleum is excluded as a "hazardous substance" under the
Act. SARA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
36. Ohio v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 439 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (responsible party is potentially liable for virtually every cost involved in the
cleanup of a hazardous waste site). "Response actions may include both 'removal'
(i.e., clean up of the spilled substance) and 'remedial action' (i.e., dredging, repair of
leaking containers, collection of rainfall runoff, relocation of displaced residents."
[Vol. 161046
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss4/6
ENVIRONMENTAL-QUALITY INSURANCE
designated as a party liable for response costs.37
2. Parties Liable Under CERCLA
CERCLA specifies four categories of parties, known as "poten-
tially responsible parties" (PRPs) who can be held liable for the costs
of cleaning up a hazardous waste site:38 (1) the present owner or op-
erator3 9 of the property; (2) the past owner or operator 4O of the
property at the time the hazardous substances contaminated the
property; (3) persons arranging for disposal or treatment at,4 ' or
Id. at 438-39 (citing SARA § 101(23)-(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(25) (1982)); see also
supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing response costs).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also infra notes
38-44 and accompanying text.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
39. The meaning of "operator" and "owner" can be gleaned from an examina-
tion of the Act's legislative history. CERCLA is the product of four bills which were
combined and enacted in the waning hours of the 96th Congress. One of the four
bills defines an "operator" as "a person who is carrying out operational functions for
the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement." See Comprehensive
Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (first draft), H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6160,
6181-82. Section 101(x) of this bill defined "owner" as "any person holding title to,
or, in the absence of title, any other indicia of ownership of a... facility." Id. See also
United States Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Md. 1986). It is
not necessary that the current owner or operator have done anything to cause the
release, or threat of release, but only that the release or threat of release occur dur-
ing its ownership or operation. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (5th Cir. 1988).
40. Section 107(a)(l) of CERCLA states that a former owner or operator of land
containing hazardous waste may be liable for cleanup costs only if it owned or oper-
ated the facility "at the time of the disposal of any hazardous substance." Id. at 1573.
See United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1982) (court held that there must be an actual depositing of hazardous sub-
stances during prior ownership for CERCLA liability to attach to a past owner or
operator); see also Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles- Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d at 1573
(the disposal need not have been a "one-time occurrence ... there may have been
other disposals when hazardous materials are moved, dispersed, or released during
landfill excavations and fillings").
41. "Arrange for" is not defined by the statute, but "disposal" is defined as "the
discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing" of any hazard-
ous substance such that the "substance may enter the environment." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Congress used broad language in providing for
liability for persons who "by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for" the dispo-
sal of hazardous materials. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842,
845 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (emphasis added by the court). Courts have concluded that a
liberal judicial interpretation is consistent with CERCLA's "overwhelmingly reme-
dial" scheme. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986). The Act's legislative history sheds some light on the in-
tended meaning of this phrase. The Hazardous Waste Containment Act proposed to
regulate inactive hazardous sites, extending liability to "any person who caused or
contributed to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances." Id. (emphasis
1990]
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transport of hazardous substances to, the property; and (4) persons
accepting hazardous substances for transport42 to a contaminated
site selected by such persons. These parties are liable to the EPA for
injunctive relief requiring site cleanup,43 or to any other party in-
cluding the EPA and state and local governments for the costs in-
curred during the cleanup of a contaminated site.44 While parties
are strictly liable for cleanup costs, without regard to negligence, po-
tentially responsible parties are not absolutely liable. Certain de-
fenses are set out in section 107 of the Act.
3. Defenses to Liability
a. Security Interest Exception
Section 9607(a) of CERCLA identifies "owners and operators" as
parties who can be held liable for the remedial costs of cleaning up a
hazardous waste facility.45 Section 9601(20)(A) however excludes
added); H.R. REP. No. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6128, cited in New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d
Cir. 1985).
The "Environmental Emergency Response Act" originally extended liability to
"any person who caused or contributed" to a release of hazardous substances (emphasis
added). S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY-THE EVOLUTION OF SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRON-
MENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT 561, 573 (1983). A Senate
Committee on Environmental and Public Works later changed this language to the
"any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for" language incor-
porated into the Act itself. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUBLIC WORKS,
Working Paper No. 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY-THE EVOLUTION OF SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVI-
RONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT 607, 617 (1983). See also
Comment, "Arrangingfor Disposal" Under CERCIA: When is a Generator Liable?, 15 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10160, 10163 (1985) (discussing the legislative history sur-
rounding CERCLA's strict liability scheme).
"Treatment" is defined in section 6903(34) as:
[Any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to
change the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any
hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste
nonhazardous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery, amenable for
storage, or reduced in volume.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (1982).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
43. Id.
44. Section 9607 imposes strict liability. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32, reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-THE EVOLUTION OF SE-
LECTED SECTIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION
AND LIABILITY ACT 303, 304 (1983);J.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266
(6th Cir. 1985). Section 9607 imposes strict liability without regard for causation.
Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). See supra note 39 and accompanying text (dis-
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from the "owner or operator" definition persons who merely hold a
security interest in the property.46 A lender is excluded who "with-
out participating in the management.., holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest . . . ."47 Lender liability
arises where the lender participates in the management of the prop-
erty or exercises his right to foreclose on the security interest.48
There are two important decisions concerning the liability of secured
parties: 1) United States v. Mirabile49 and 2) United States v. Maryland
Bank Trust Co.50
1) The Mirabile Decision
In this case American Bank & Trust Company (AB&T) foreclosed
on its security interest in the property and was the highest bidder at
the sheriff's sale.51 AB&T subsequently assigned its bid at the sher-
iff's sale to the Mirabiles who accepted a sheriff's deed to the prop-
erty.5 2 The United States brought action against the Mirabiles to
obtain reimbursement of costs incurred in the cleanup of hazardous
waste deposited on the property.53 The Mirabiles named AB&T as a
third-party defendant, alleging that AB&T was liable because of ac-
tions taken during their course of dealings with a prior operator of
the facility at the time of disposal.54 AB&T moved for summary
judgment, claiming that the section 9601 (20)(A) security interest ex-
ception precluded them from liability as an "owner or operator." 55
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania held that under the security exception to owner liability, if
"a secured creditor does not become overly entangled in the affairs
of the actual owner or operator of a facility, the creditor may not be
held liable for cleanup costs." 56 The court found that before a se-
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982).
47. Section 101(20)(A) provides in full:
.owner or operator" means ... (iii) in the case of an abandoned facility, any
person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facil-
ity immediately prior to such abandonment. Such term does not include a
person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
vessel or facility;
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982).
48. See Killion, supra note 24, at 5.
49. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
50. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
51. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20993.
52. Id.
53. Id. EPA had provided the Mirabiles with different cleanup opportunities but
the Mirabiles failed to respond. Id.
54. Id. at 20995. The Mirabiles joined American Bank and Trust Company
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cured creditor could be held liable, "it must, at a minimum, partici-
pate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site." 57 While
AB&T had taken certain steps to protect the property after foreclo-
sure, the court held that these were "prudent and routine steps to
secure the property against further depreciation" and did not make
AB&T an owner or operator of the property.5 8
2) The Maryland Bank Decision
The United States brought action against Maryland Bank & Trust
Co. to recover cleanup costs incurred at a farm site in California,
Maryland.59 During 1972-73, the owners permitted the dumping of
hazardous wastes on the farm.60 The parties dubbed the property
the California Maryland Drum site or "CMD" site. In 1980, the own-
ers of the site during the 1972-73 disposal of hazardous waste sold
the property to their son. Maryland Bank provided the financing for
the purchase and secured the loan with a mortgage on the prop-
erty.6' The bank instituted a foreclosure action against CMD in 1981
and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale in May of 1982.
In October of 1983, the EPA cleaned up the site.62 Maryland Bank
moved for summary judgment, relying on the secured-party excep-
tion contained in section 9601(20)(A).
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland re-
jected Maryland Bank's argument, holding that "[tihe exemption of
subsection (20)(A) covers only those persons who, at the time of the
clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security
interest in the land."63 The court found that the security interest
must have existed at the time of the EPA cleanup: "Only during the
life of the mortgage did [Maryland Bank] hold indicia of ownership
primarily to protect its security interest in the land."6 4
b. The Third-Party Defense
Section 107 of the Act provides three affirmative defenses to liabil-
ity: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; and (3) an act or omission of a
third-party.65 Parties have little control over acts of war or acts of
57. Id. at 20996.
58. Id.
59. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Md.
1986).
60. Id. Wastes on the property included organics such as toluene, ethylbenzene
and total xylenes and heavy metals such as lead, chromium, mercury and zinc. Id.
61. Id. The new owner, McLeod, soon failed to make payments on the loan.
62. Id. The EPA removed two hundred thirty-seven drums of chemical material
and 1180 tons of contaminated soil. Id. at 575-76.
63. Id. at 579.
64. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
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God, and most documents provide various rights and remedies
should an act of war or God occur.66 Acts of an unrelated third-
party, however, are another matter. Under the third-party defense,
a party can escape liability if it can establish that the release or
threatened release was caused solely by a third person who is neither
an agent nor employee of the defendant and with whom the defend-
ant is not in a contractual relationship.67 The term "contractual rela-
tionship" was not defined in CERCLA until enactment of SARA in
1986.68
B. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)
The original CERCLA provisions imposed strict liability only upon
those who participated in, and received profits from, the creation of
hazardous waste sites. 69 After CERCLA's enactment it became ap-
parent that the number of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites was
much larger than originally anticipated in 1979-80.70 The legislative
history of the Superfund amendments indicates a congressional
awareness that the EPA would not have adequate resources to
cleanup all of the hazardous waste sites that needed attention.T1
Consequently, the 1986 amendments may represent a shift in the
philosophy of recovery from CERCLA's strict adherence to the con-
cept that the source or beneficiary of toxic waste must pay, to
SARA's recognition that costs of cleanup must now be apportioned
over a broader range of parties. 72 The most important and most liti-
66. See Schwenke, Environmental Liabilities Imposed on Landowners, Tenants, and Lend-
ers-How Far Can and Should They Extend?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10361,
10362 (1988) ("Conveyancing, leasing, and financing documents are replete with
paragraph-after-paragraph, if not page-after-page, providing various remedies and
rights should an act of God or an act of war occur."). Id.
67. Section 9607(b)(3) provides, in part, that "[t]here shall be no liability.., for
a person otherwise liable who can establish ... that the release... and the damages
resulting therefrom" were caused solely by:
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant... if the
defendant establishes ... that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance .. .and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
68. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
69. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1982). The court notes that CERCLA's objective is to "facilitate the
prompt cleanup of hazardous dump sites by ... placing the ultimate financial burden
upon those responsible for the danger." Id. at 1142-43.
70. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
71. H.R. REP. No., 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2837.
72. Id. The underlying principle of SARA is to "[fQacilitate cleanups of hazard-
105119901
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gated provision of the SARA amendments is the innocent landowner
or innocent purchaser defense.7T
1. The Innocent Landowner Defense
SARA's innocent landowner defense is essentially an expansion of
the third-party defense outlined in CERCLA.74 This provision al-
lows a potentially responsible party to escape liability if it can estab-
lish that the release was caused solely by a third-party with whom it
had no contractual relationship. 75 To successfully raise the innocent
landowner defense, it must be established that (1) the defendant had
no contractual relationship with the third-party;76 and (2) at the time
the defendant acquired the facility, it did not know and had no rea-
son to know that any hazardous substance had been disposed at the
property.77
a. Contractual Relationship
The Superfund amendments added section 9601(35)(A) to CER-
CLA, providing a definition of "contractual relationship" for pur-
poses of the section 9607(b)(3) third-party defense. The first part of
section 9601(35)(A) states that a "contractual relationship . . . in-
cludes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instru-
ments transferring title or possession .... "78 The second part of the
section sets forth a two-pronged exception to the general definition.
A relationship will not be deemed a "contractual relationship" if: (1)
"the real property on which the facility concerned is located was ac-
quired by the defendant after the disposal. .. of the hazardous sub-
stance... at the facility... ;-79 and (2) one or more of the following
ous substances by the responsible parties while assuring a strong EPA oversight role
with a set of tough legal enforcement standards." Id. (emphasis added); See Contribu-
tion Under CERCLA: Judicial Treatment After SARA, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 267, 269
(1989) (noting that the House Report illustrates Congress' intent that SARA respond
to the problem of inadequate EPA resources); see also Schwenke, supra note 66, at
10362 (suggesting that the senate finance committee recognized that the cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste sites was a broad societal problem extending beyond the
chemical and petroleum industries).
73. The terms "innocent landowner provision" and "third-party defense" will be
used interchangeably throughout this note.
74. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
75. See 42 U.S.C § 9607(b)(3) (1982) ("There shall be no liability [if the release
was caused] solely by ... an act or omission of a third party other than ... one whose
act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship.").
76. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See infra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text.
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circumstances is established by the defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did
not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance...
was disposed of on, in, or at the facility; 80
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facil-
ity by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisi-
tion, or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by
purchase or condemnation; 8 '
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or
bequest.8
2
In drafting section 9601(35) Congress intended to eliminate liability
under section 9607(a) for only those landowners who acquire prop-
erty after disposal of hazardous substances, and remain ignorant of
their presence despite exercising due care to discover such
substances .83
2. The Duty to Inquire
Section 9601(35)(A) provides that a defendant must have "had no
reason to know" that any hazardous substance had been deposited at
the facility in order to successfully employ the innocent landowner
defense.8 4 To establish that a defendant had "no reason to know,"
the defendant must have undertaken "at the time of acquisition, all
appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the
property .... "85 This inquiry must be performed in a manner "con-
sistent with good commercial and customary practice .... "86
There is no case law or EPA interpretation of the "reasonable in-
80. Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
81. Id. § 9601(35)(A)(ii).
82. Id. § 9601(35)(A)(iii).
83. See Killion, supra note 24, at 12 citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276, 3280.
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
85. See id. § 9601(35)(B). See also H.R. CONF. Rvr. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
187, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276, 3280:
The duty to inquire under this provision shall be judged as of the time of
acquisition. Defendants shall be held to a higher standard as public aware-
ness of the hazards associated with hazardous substance releases has
grown.... Those engaged in commercial transactions should, however, be
held to a higher standard than those who are engaged in private residential
transactions.
Id.
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). This section provides
that the court, in evaluating the quality of a defendants inquiry, shall take into
account:
[A]ny specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontami-
nated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the
property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamina-
1990] 1053
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quiry" requirement of the innocent landowner exception.87 There
are, however, certain measures which parties can take to reduce the
risk of exposure to hazardous substance liability.88 A comprehensive
audit by an environmental consultant should generally be sufficient
to satisfy the reasonable inquiry requirement.8
9
II. PROBLEMS wrrH THE CERCLA LEGISLATION
Public interest in the environmental effects of improperly disposed
hazardous waste has evolved from a localized grass roots movement
into one of the most important social and political issues of modem
times. While public policy clearly supports environmental legisla-
tion, the economic burden that CERCLA has placed on the shoul-
ders of American business demands immediate legislative and
judicial re-thinking. Part II will serve two functions. First, it will ex-
amine CERCLA's negative impact on three parties: 1) the lender, 2)
the real estate investor, and 3) the court. Second, this section will
argue that the environmental consultant is the next judicial target for
CERCLA liability and will outline the courts' probable rationale.
A. CERCLA's Negative Impact
1. The Lender
a. Damage to Collateral
Lenders can easily avoid direct liability for hazardous waste
tion at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appro-
priate inspection.
Id. See also H.R. CONF. Rvr. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276, 3280: "[G]ood commercial or customary practice
with respect to inquiry in an effort to minimize liability shall mean that a reasonable
inquiry must have been made in all circumstances, in light of best business and land
transfer principles." Id.
87. Epstein & Karlsson, Hazardous Loans: Lender Risks Under Superfund, ENVTL. C.J.
231, 240 (Winter 1989).
88. In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986), the court suggested that lenders should conduct an environmental audit of a
potential borrower before granting a loan ("financial institutions are in a position to
investigate and discover potential problems in their secured properties ... CERCLA
will not absolve them from responsibility for mistakes ofjudgment."). lId at 580.
89. See Zinn & Fraxedas, Transactional Environmental Audits: What to Expect From
Your Consultant, FLA. BJ., Apr. 1988, at 55. Two types of environmental audits are
distinguished. "Operational environmental audits" are designed to show operating
businesses how to comply with the environmental regulations to which they are sub-
ject." Id. "[T]ransactional environmental audits" which involve lenders, buyers, sell-
ers, brokers, attorneys, and consultants, are designed to appraise concerned parties
of the environmental health or decay of real estate. Id. At a minimum, an environ-
mental consultant should examine tax records, title abstracts, historical aerial photo-
graphs, court records, local building records, and local government records. Id.
1054 [Vol. 16
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cleanup.90 The innocent purchaser defense codified in the SARA
amendments allows lenders to escape liability through the perform-
ance of a "due diligence" environmental audit.9i Therefore direct
liability for waste contamination is of little threat to the prudent
lender. Rather, the lender's primary concern over hazardous waste
is damage to the collateral value of the property. 92 Property contam-
inated by hazardous waste presents the owner with potential liability
for millions of dollars in cleanup costs.9 3 Even if the borrower has
agreed to cleanup hazardous waste, the cost may be so high as to
bankrupt the borrower.94 Moreover, property contaminated by toxic
waste is usually unmarketable. The lender may therefore be com-
pelled to abandon the collateral altogether.95
b. Eliminating Foreclosure Remedy
Section 9601(20)(A) of CERCLA provides that a person holding
an indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest is
not a responsible party under CERCLA.96 According to the court in
Maryland Bank, the security interest exclusion is forfeited once the
lender acquires title through foreclosure. 9 7 The court stated that the
lender always has the option of not foreclosing and not bidding at
the foreclosure sale.98 This interpretation, however, seems adverse
to the legislative intent to protect the holder of a security interest.9 9
By discouraging the exercise of the foreclosure remedy a lender's
security interest protection becomes meaningless.O0
2. The Real Estate Investor
Despite the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure re-
quirements,t0i businessmen are becoming increasingly reluctant to
90. Pulles, Hazardous Waste: The Lender's Perspective, Lender Liability, and Bankruptcy
Issues, at 4, Environmental Liability for Real Estate and Banking Attorneys (Minne-
sota Continuing Legal Education 1989).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
92. Pulles, supra note 90, at 3.
93. See, e.g., McMahon, Lender's Perspectives on Hazardous Waste and Similar Liabilities,
18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10368, 10368 (1988) ("the average Superfund
clean-up is now $12 million ... that figure may triple to $36 million").
94. Pulles, supra note 90, at 3.
95. Id. (quoting Peter Patchin, January 1988, The Appraisal Journal).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). See supra notes 45-64 and accompanying
text.
97. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md.
1986).
98. Id. at 580 n.6.
99. See Pulles, supra note 90, at 5.
100. Id.
101. See Varnum & Achterman, Toxic Waste Liability: A Risk in Acquisitions, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 28, 1985, at 18, col. 2. Securities laws require disclosure of hazardous waste
1990] 1055
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invest in businesses which might generate, transport or store hazard-
ous waste products.102 Investors are beginning to discover that po-
tential liability often outweighs the investment opportunity of a
potentially profitable company.' 0 3 Rather than deterring abandon-
ment, current trends have resulted in the alienation of lands and
businesses which may have at one point been associated with hazard-
ous waste.
3. The Court
CERCLA has effectively transformed the court system into a debt
collection agency for the EPA. The philosophical formula under-
scoring the 1980 Superfund legislation was deceptively simple:
cleanup now-litigate later.104 In theory, this arrangement is a
sound means of effecting swift remedial action upon known hazard-
ous waste sites. The policy insures that mitigating environmental
harm will take precedence over fund reimbursement. In practice,
however, this mechanism is both costly and inefficient. CERCLA
does not merely encourage litigation, it requires litigation. If the EPA
exercises its discretionary power to use CERCIA funding to facilitate
the cleanup of a hazardous waste site, the only legislative prescrip-
tion for cost reimbursement is judicial action.105 As a result, court
dockets clog with CERCLA liability suits and potentially responsible
parties incur millions of dollars in attorney fees and court costs. The
current liability system is simply not an efficient way of doing
business.
B. Environmental Consultant Liability
Environmental consultants are playing an increasingly important
role in determining the success of residential and commercial real
estate transactions. Existing statutory defenses to liability provide
very little protection in the absence of an extensive environmental
audit.106 As a result, the growth of the hazardous waste consulting
market has soared to an estimated $1 billion per year.' 07 It is inter-
esting to note that of all the parties involved in a typical real estate
disposal. This information allows potential purchasers access to data which would be
otherwise unavailable. A failure to disclose may give rise to a cause of action under
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Id.
102. See Glass, supra note 16, at 386.
103. See Freeman, Tort Law Reform: Superfund/RCRA Liability as a Major Cause of the
Insurance Crisis, 21 TORT INS. LJ. 517, 533 (1986).
104. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
105. Id
106. See Zinn & Fraxedas, supra note 89, at 55 ("the language does not merely
suggest an audit, it requires an audit to escape liability").
107. See, e.g., Legal Liability Called Primary Barrier to Market Entry by Consulting Engi-
neers, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 558, 558 (1986).
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transaction,108 the environmental consultant is the only participant
that 1) has not been held to be a "potentially responsible party"
under CERCLA, and 2) profits from the continued existence of haz-
ardous waste sites. If the legislature and judiciary are looking for
additional deep pockets, their search may be over.' 09
CERCLA has been called a deep pocket statute in that it provides a
court with the statutory authority to find the deep pocket liable,
often seemingly ignoring whether it is reasonable or equitable to do
so." 0 A court sometimes acts equitably and finds that a party has
only a casual relationship with the hazardous waste site and therefore
is not within the statute's classes of liable parties."' The relation-
ship between the environmental consultant and real estate contami-
nated with hazardous waste, however, is anything but casual.
Most consultants are chemical engineers"t2 specializing in de-
tecting and remedying the dangerous effects of environmental con-
tamination. Environmental consultants have the power to single-
handedly fulfill the fundamental purpose of CERCLA: to locate and
facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Moreover,
careless and wanton environmental audits are detrimental not only
to the physical health of the environment but also to the financial
health of this nation's real estate, lending, and investment indus-
tries.1t3 The environmental consultant does not seem to be the type
of party that courts should absolve from CERCLA liability out of a
spirit of equity.
The existing environmental legislation and related case law pro-
vide a solid framework for finding environmental consultants liable
for CERCLA response costs. 1 14 The discussion that follows will ar-
gue that a consultant, while performing an environmental audit, is an
108. Typical parties to a modem commercial or industrial real estate transaction
include the buyer, seller, lender, mortgage banker, attorney, and environmental
consultant.
109. Environmental consultants may be considered "deep pockets" by the courts
because of the large profits earned through their consulting efforts.
110. See Glass, supra note 16, at 413. For recent cases demonstrating this appar-
ent unreasonableness, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
111. See generally United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994
(E.D. Pa. 1985). See also Glass, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
112. See Zinn & Fraxedas, supra note 89 and accompanying text. See generally Duffy,
Selecting, Contracting With, and Working With Your Environmental Consultant: A Consultant's
Perspective, at 1, Environmental Liability for Real Estate and Banking Attorneys (Min-
nesota Continuing Legal Education 1989) (suggesting criteria for selecting an envi-
ronmental consultant).
113. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of what courts
have construed as response costs.
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"operator" within the meaning of CERCLA.'15 The conclusion
reached is that failure to detect a "release"116 or "threat of re-
lease""l 7 of a hazardous substance actually present at the site, tech-
nically subjects the environmental consultant to liability for cleanup
costs.
C. Consultant as Operator
In deciding whether a party fits within one of the four categories of
liable parties,' 18 most courts perform a strict and mechanistic appli-
cation of the statute to the facts of the case."t 9 In addition, "in an
effort to find liability wherever possible, the courts have interpreted
the statutory categories of liable parties quite broadly."t 20 Conse-
quently, defendants who are associated with or who have derived
profits from the existence of hazardous waste are likely to be held
liable as responsible parties under CERCIA.t2
1. Facility
CERCLA identifies an operator as "any person owning or operat-
ing [a] facility ..... "122 The term facility is defined as "any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited .... "123 It is
115. See supra notes 39-40 for a discussion of present and past owner and operator
liability.
116. See supra note 34 for a discussion of what is a "release" under the Act.
117. See supra note 34 for a discussion of what is considered a "threat of release"
under the Act.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See supra notes 38-44 and
accompanying text for a discussion of liable parties under CERCLA.
119. Glass, supra note 16, at 412. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that a "construction of
CERCLA to impose liability upon only the corporation and not the individual corpo-
rate officers and employees who are responsible for making corporate decisions
about the handling and disposal of hazardous substances would open an enormous,
and clearly unintended loophole in the statutory scheme").
120. Glass, supra note 16, at 413. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1043-45, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (owner of property responsible for state's
response costs and stockholder and officer of property owner liable as operator
under CERCLA); United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56, 59-60 (D.N.H. 1984)
("corporate officers may... be individually liable for the torts of a corporation where
they participate in the tortious activity"); New York v. General Electric Co., 592 F.
Supp. 291, 295-97 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendant liable for selling transformer oil con-
taining hazardous substances). But see Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (owner which
purchased site after disposals had been made cannot be liable). Id. at 412 n.198.
121. See Glass, supra note 16, at 413. Glass refers to CERCLA as a "deep pocket
statute" which enables the government to impose liability on a party with adequate
financial resources to bear the cost of cleanup. Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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important to distinguish the "site of deposit" from the "site of gen-
eration." In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chemical Co., 124
hazardous substances produced at a chemical manufacturing plant
were deposited at an off-site rural farm.125 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the farm site and not the chemical plant was the
"facility" within the meaning of CERCLA.126 Since the defendants
neither owned nor operated the farm site, they could not be held
liable as the "owners or operators" of a "facility."127 Consequently,
the issue of consultant liability should focus not on whether the con-
sultant was an operator at the site of waste production, but rather on
whether he was an operator at the site of contamination.128
Courts have construed the term facility very broadly to include
"virtually any place at which hazardous wastes have been dumped, or
otherwise disposed of."129 As a result, the scene of any environmen-
tal audit could qualify as a CERCLA facility. The remaining issue is
whether the consultant is an operator of the site of contamination
within the meaning of the statute.
2. Operator
CERCLA does not define the term operator. However some in-
sight into its intended meaning can be gleaned from an examination
of the Act's legislative history.tSO CERCLA is the product of four
bills which were combined and enacted into the present statute.' 3 '
One of the four bills defines "operator" as "a person who is carrying
out operational functions for the owner of the facility."132 In New
124. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
125. Id. at 730. The drums containing the hazardous waste were dumped on the
farm in July of 1971. The EPA received an "anonymous tip" about the waste in
October 1979. Id. The EPA investigated in April 1980 and found approximately 85
55-gallon drums containing hazardous material. Soil samples of the site revealed
"alarmingly" high concentrations of hazardous chemicals. Id.
126. Id. The Eighth Circuit adopted the reasoning that the term "facility" in the
CERCLA statute should be broadly construed. The government's cleanup efforts
were undertaken at the farm site and not the pharmaceutical plant, thus the appropri-
ate facility in this case was the farm site. Id.
127. Idt
128. See infra notes 130-55 and accompanying text.
129. See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (D.N.C. 1985) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982)).
130. See Comprehensive Oil Pollution and Compensation Act (first draft), H.R.
REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6119, 6181.
131. See Ohio v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 450-55 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (discussing CERCLA's legislative history).
132. H.R. REP. No. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 3 SUPERFUND: A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY-THE EVOLUTION OF SELECTED SECTIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE EN-
VIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT 451, 454 (1983).
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York v. Shore Realty Corp., 13 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
the managing stockholders of a corporation liable as "owners and
operators" of a contaminated waste site.134 The court noted that the
defendant was "in charge of the operation of the facility ... and as
such [was] an 'operator' within the meaning of CERCLA."135 Legis-
lative history and judicial interpretation suggest that two elements
are required for a party to be an operator: (1) the party must be obli-
gated to perform certain operational functions,13 6 and (2) the party
must be in charge.IS7
a. Operational Functions
The dictionary definition of "operation" is "an effect brought
about in accordance with a definite plan; action; activity."' 8 The
services of an environmental consultant are secured for one purpose
or effect: to make a reasonably accurate' 39 determination as to the
environmental health of the subject property. To achieve this effect,
the consultant performs various tasks in accordance with a written
action plan or project proposal.140 An environmental consultant,
therefore, performs "operational functions" when conducting an en-
vironmental audit at a hazardous waste site.
133. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
134. Id. at 1052. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the stockholder/
officer liable without piercing the corporate veil. Id. The Second Circuit cited New
York corporate law and held "that a corporate officer who controls corporate con-
duct and thus is an active individual participant in the conduct is liable for the torts of
the corporation." See State v. Ole Olsen, Ltd., 53 N.Y.2d 979, 324 N.E.2d 886, 365
N.Y.S.2d 528 (1975); LaLumia v. Schwartz, 23 A.D.2d 668, 669, 257 N.Y.S.2d 348,
350 (1965).
135. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1052. The court noted that its
conclusion was "consistent with that of other courts that have addressed the issue."
Id. (citing as examples United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20699, 20700 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
136. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
138. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 984 (5th ed. 1979). The word "operation" has
been neither defined in the statute nor interpreted by the courts. Therefore, this
note assumes, for the sake of this argument, that courts will adopt the "plain mean-
ing" of the word.
139. See Duffy, supra note 112, at 5. "The [environmental audit] cannot and does
not certify to non-contamination .... The investigation ... is intended to minimize
risks consistent with the nature of the study which the client authorizes using cur-
rently accepted (state of the art) techniques and procedures." Id.
140. Id. at 3-4. The scope of a consultant's services typically include: (1) a review
of pertinent site documentation, (2) a site inspection, (3) other specific site investiga-
tions such as asbestos testing, PCB analysis, and groundwater monitoring, and (4)
preparation of an environmental investigation report. Id.
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There is no definition of the term "in charge" within CERCLA.
The language is used, however, in outlining the statute's reporting
requirements.14, The meaning of the phrase was discussed in a re-
cent Second Circuit Court of Appeals case. In United States v. Carr, 142
a supervisor of maintenance directed a work crew to dispose of waste
paint cans in an inappropriate manner 43 and failed to report the
resulting release of the hazardous substances to the EPA. 144 The
court recognized that CERCLA is silent as to the meaning of "in
charge"'45 and focused its analysis on the statute's legislative his-
tory. 146 The court held that the term "in charge" includes "any rea-
sonable person," 47 even those of relatively low rank, "who were in
the position to detect, prevent and abate the release of hazardous
substances."148
In United States v. Mobil Oil Corporation,149 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals contemplated the definition of "in charge" in the context of
the reporting requirements of the Clean Water Act.150 The court
held that "in charge" referred to parties occupying positions of re-
sponsibility.51 The court noted that parties in charge of hazardous
waste are in the best position to make a timely discovery of the re-
lease and have the capacity to "prevent and abate" the environmen-
tal damage.152
While judicial interpretations of the "in charge" language are not
uniform, they differ only in the degree of authority that the operator
141. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) states, in pertinent part, that
-any person ... in charge of a facility from which a hazardous substance is released,
... who fails to notify immediately the appropriate agency... shall, upon conviction,
be fined ... or imprisoned .... or both." Id.
142. 880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989).
143. Id at 1551. The defendant had ordered his workers to toss cans of waste
paint into a man-made pit filled with water. The workers had thrown approximately
50 cans into the pond before they noticed paint was leaking from the cans. They
then stacked the remaining cans in a nearby shed. Id.
144. Id. at 1551. The defendant subsequently ordered the workers to cover up the
paint cans in the pond with dirt. The investigation by the EPA was triggered when
one worker reported the disposal of the cans to a relative who was a special agent
with the Department of Defense.
145. Id. at 1552-53.
146. See 1 SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D
SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND) 62 (Comm. Print 1983)
(cited in United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d at 1552).
147. United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d at 1553.
148. Id. at 1554.
149. 464 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1972).
150. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1988).
151. United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d at 1128.
152. Id. at 1127.
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must command.t53 Courts appear to be in unequivocal agreement,
however, that a party in charge has the distinct characteristic of being
in the position to prevent and abate the release of hazardous sub-
stances.' 54 This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that it
supports one of the driving purposes of CERCLA.155
c. Summary
Any site at which an environmental consultant performs an envi-
ronmental audit is a "facility" within the meaning of CERCLA.156 In
performing the operational functions157 of the audit, the consultant
takes charge of the site as evidenced by his unique ability to "prevent
and abate"'' 8 the release of hazardous substances. Consequently,
the environmental consultant is an "operator of a facility"159 and
could be held liable under CERCLA for response costs.'
6 0
III. ENVIRONMENTAL-QUALITY INSURANCE
Reflecting upon CERCLA's legislative and judicial evolution dur-
ing the 1980s, the discussion above has suggested three conclusions:
1) considering the large amount of money expended, CERCLA has,
at best, made only a relatively small impact on the nation's hazardous
waste problem; 2) the Act's cost recovery mechanism is ineffective
and has brought fear and uncertainty into the real estate and banking
industries; and 3) the environmental consultant, the essential ingre-
dient in a successful innocent landowner defense, may soon be num-
bered among CERCLA's numerous liable parties.
It was Congress' original intent that the ultimate financial burden
of environmental cleanup should come to rest upon those responsi-
ble for creating hazardous waste sites and those who derive profit
from their continued existence.'61 In an effort to find liability wher-
ever possible, however, courts have interpreted CERCLA's responsi-
ble party categories rather broadly. The innocent landowner defense
153. Compare United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir. 1989) ("in
charge" includes even those "of relatively low rank") with United States v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 464 F.2d at 1128 ("in charge" includes only those persons "who occupy posi-
tions of responsibility and power").
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
161. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9633 (1982) (Congress had established a "Hazardous
Substance Response Trust Fund"). See also Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 8 (1982).
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provides some relief to the virtuous purchaser who, despite the com-
pletion of a pre-purchase environmental audit, discovers that his in-
vestment has been polluted with toxic contaminants. But there is no
defense to protect a lender against the loss of his collateral or his
inability to assert common law foreclosure rights. Nor is there relief
for the real estate investor who learns that hazardous waste has ren-
dered his property unmarketable. Most importantly, CERCLA pro-
vides no help to the ordinary real estate purchaser who desires
nothing more than the quiet enjoyment of his property but discovers
that Blackacre poses life threatening risks to his health.
Buyers, sellers, investors and lenders need some means of assur-
ing the environmental "wellness" of real estate. The creation of en-
vironmental-quality insurance, analogous to title insurance, would
provide such assurance. The current condition of environmental law
is strikingly similar to the conditions that existed immediately prior
to the advent of the title insurance industry. The discussion that fol-
lows will first discuss the genesis of the title insurance industry and
the elements of a title insurance program. Second, a program of en-
vironmental-quality insurance will be outlined.
A. Title Insurance Industry
1. History
Title insurance involves the issuance of an insurance policy prom-
ising that if the condition of the title is different than that stated on
the face of the policy, and if the insured suffers damage as a conse-
quence of the difference, the insurer will reimburse the insured for
all losses and legal expenses incurred up to the policy amount.' 62
Title insurance provides a standardized nationwide means of assur-
ing titles and has dramatically reduced the risk-of-loss problems in-
herent in the traditional methods of title assurance.' 63
a. Title Assurance Mechanisms Before 1868
On October 14, 1066, William of Normandy crossed the English
Channel, defeated King Harold at the battle of Hastings, and the
162. See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 1:105 (rev. ed. 1984):
Title guaranty insurance is a contract whereby one agrees for a considera-
tion to protect another against all loss or damage, not in excess of a speci-
fied sum . . . . The insurer under a title insurance policy undertakes to
indemnify the insured if the title proves to be defective. Knowledge of de-
fects in the title by the insured in no way lessens the liability of the insurer.
The doctrine of skill or negligence has no application to such a contract.
Id. See generally D. BURKE, LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE 2 (1986), citing Rooney, Title In-
surance: A Primer for Attorneys, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 608, 610 (1979).
163. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOP-
MENT 227 (3d ed. 1987).
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English feudal system was born.164 Out of feudalism there devel-
oped a system of land holdings whereby real property was held by
the possessor, not as an owner, but rather as a tenant of a feudal
lord.165 The population explosion of rural England during the thir-
teenth century created an increasing demand for land.166 As a re-
sult, the belief that a tenant should have the power to convey his fee
absent a lord's consent began to gain popularity.167 By the end of
the thirteenth century, the Statute Quia Emptores' 68 established that
the fee was freely alienable.
Once the fee became alienable, a system of freehold estates devel-
oped giving form to the concept of private land ownership.16 9 As
the incidence of private ownership began to increase, so too did the
frequency of real estate transfers and the need to insure that the
seller had the right to convey the property. Methods of title assur-
ance were therefore developed enabling the purchaser to both dis-
cover in advance whether the seller had the ability to convey the
quality of title claimed, and obtain a post-purchase cause of action
against the seller if the state of the title turned out to be less than
represented.17o The most important forms of traditional title assur-
ance are 1) the deed covenant; and 2) the recording system.
1) Deed Covenant
Of all of the title assurance mechanisms in use in this country, the
deed covenant or warranty deed is by far the least effective. The
deed covenant is comprised of six distinct types of title covenants.' 7 '
164. SeeJ. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 145 (2nd ed. 1988).
165. Id. at 157. During the period immediately following the Norman Conquest, a
tenant's interest (termed "fee" or "fief") was unalienable. Upon death, a tenant's
interest in the land ceased, and the lord was under no obligation to recognize the
tenant's heir as his successor. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, inheritance
became a matter of right. Id. at 157.
166. Id.
167. The desire for unilateral conveyance rights was rooted in economic concerns.
As the rural population began to increase, so too did the value of land. Landowners
were therefore tempted to sell before they died and cut off their heir's right to suc-
cession. Id.
168. Quia Emptores, enacted by Parliament in 1290, established the principle of
free alienation of land. As a result, all free tenants had the right to transfer all or part
of their land without having to secure the lord's consent. Id at 152-53. See Cairns,
The Explanatory Process in the Field of Inheritance, 20 IowA L. REV. 266, 277 (1935).
169. The four possessory estates in land are: I) the fee simple, 2) the fee tail, 3) the
life estate, and 4) the leasehold. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 164, at
156-84 (discussing the types of traditional possessory estates in land).
170. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 163, at 181.
171. The first three covenants are termed "present" covenants, as they can be
breached only at the moment the deed is delivered. The first is a covenant ofseisin,
which is a promise by the grantor that he owns the land ("well seized"). The light to
convey, like the covenant of seisin, promises that the grantor has the authority to con-
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The integrity of each covenant, however, is derived simply from the
knowledge that the grantor has and is willing to reveal about the ti-
tle. Title covenants allocate the risk of undisclosed title defects
among the parties but provide no external financial pool for indem-
nification of the party on whom the risk falls. 172 Instead, the grantee
must either absorb a loss without further recovery, or institute an
action against the grantor under a breach of warranty theory. 173
2) Recording System
The public recording of deeds, liens, and other instruments affect-
ing title began in the Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth colonies in
1640.174 Today every state has enacted statutes or recording acts
providing for land tide records to be maintained by the county re-
corder in each county. 17 5 The recording acts do not affect the valid-
ity of a deed. A deed is a valid instrument against the grantor upon
delivery without recordation. Rather, the recording system autho-
rizes local governments to act as passive repositories for all instru-
ments affecting title which people choose to record.t76
Recording acts have the function of protecting purchasers for
value and lien creditors against prior unrecorded interests. At com-
mon law, priority of title was determined by priority in time of con-
veyance. 177 Under the recording acts, however, a subsequent bona
fide purchasert78 is protected against prior unrecorded interests.
Therefore, a prudent purchaser must perform two tasks: first, per-
vey his interest in real estate. The third present covenant, a promise against encum-
brances, alleges that title is passing free of mortgages, liens, future interests and other
covenants that run with the land.
The next three covenants are termed "future covenants" in that they are
breached only when an eviction of the grantee occurs. The warranty and quiet enjoy-
ment covenants promise to compensate the grantee for a loss if the title is defective
and the grantee suffers an eviction. Further assurances is a promise by the grantor to
execute any documents necessary to perfect the grantee's title. See G. NELSON & D.
WHrrMAN, supra note 163, at 183-84 (providing a complete discussion of the six war-
ranty deed covenants).
172. Id. at 182.
173. Id. at 182-83.
174. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 164, at 690. Public recording of
deeds was an American invention. England did not adopt a general public registra-
tion system until the twentieth century. Id.
175. There are three types of recording statutes: 1) Notice-in order to prevail
against A, B must be a purchaser for value and without notice; 2) Race-to prevail B
must record his own conveyance before A records; and 3) Race-Notice-to prevail, B
must both be a purchaser for value and without notice and also record before A. See
generally G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 163, at 194-209.
176. Id. at 194-95.
177. This concept gave rise to the common law axiom: "First in time, first in
right."
178. Bona fide purchaser status is comprised of two elements: paying value and
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form a title search of the county records for the existence of adverse
prior recorded claims on the seller's property; and second, record
the deed to bar a claim by a subsequent purchaser from a previous
owner. 179
While the recording acts provide some protection for the bona fide
purchaser, they do not guarantee clear title. The most difficult
problems arise with interests in land, such as adverse possession or
marital rights, which are not created by a written agreement. There
is no practical way for a title examiner to discover the existence of
these rights.180 Similar problems are raised by mechanics' liens.18l
Even where such technical problems are not present, other problems
may arise. "[I]t is all too easy for a searcher [title examiner] to make
a mistake.... These kind of mistakes may result in liability for dam-
ages if the searcher [or title examiner] is a lawyer or an ab-
stracter." 8 2 Damages, however, may be difficult to collect and are a
poor substitute for the land itself.183
b. Title Assurance Mechanisms After 1868
The need for title insurance arose because traditional methods of
title assurance did not provide adequate protection to prospective
real estate purchasers and produced a continuing source of potential
liability for real estate attorneys and abstractors.184 Most legal his-
torians credit a 1868 Pennsylvania case holding an abstractor liable
to a negligence standard as giving the industry its real start.' 85 In
Watson v. Muirhead,'86 a conveyancer (Muirhead) searched and ab-
stracted a title for the purchaser of a real estate tract (Watson). In
good faith and after consulting an attorney, Muirhead chose to ig-
nore certain recorded judgments and to report the title as good and
lacking notice of a prior conveyance. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 163,
at 227.
179. SeeJ. DUKEMINIER &J. KRiER, supra note 164, at 691.
180. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 163, at 202. Similar problems occur
in the bankruptcy area where property is transferred to a trustee. There is no deed
representing the transfer and therefore nothing to record. Id.
181. The priority date of a mechanic's lien relates back to the first "visible im-
provement" on the property. Because the claimant is given a period of time (gener-
ally 120 days) after completion of the work to file the claim in the public records, an
existing mechanic's lien may be "secret" and out of reach of the title examiner. Id.
182. Id. at 203.
183. Id.
184. See Gandrud, Title Insurance Overview, at 5, Title Insurance in Minnesota (Min-
nesota Continuing Legal Education 1988) ("The origin of title insurance is directly
traceable to the limited protection that the work of such a conveyancer provided the
purchaser of real property.").
185. See D. BURKE, supra note 162, at 2; Roberts, Title Insurance. State Regulation and
the Public Perspective, 39 IND. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1963).
186. 57 Pa. 161 (1868).
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unencumbered.187 Relying on Muirhead's abstract, Watson
purchased the property and was subsequently presented with, and
required to satisfy, the judgment liens that Muirhead had ignored. 188
Watson sued Muirhead to recover his losses. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court determined that an abstractor must be held to the
same negligence standard applied to an attorney.189 The court,
however, ruled that the abstractor was not negligent in preparing the
abstract and dismissed the case.190
The Pennsylvania court's determination that abstractors are to be
held to a negligence standard was important. But this ruling was
overshadowed by the reality that Watson, an innocent purchaser who
had suffered financial loss as a result of the unreported encum-
brances on his title, had no legal recourse.' 9, The decision demon-
strated that the existing title assurance protections did not supply
adequate assurance to purchasers of real estate to promote security
in their ownership.192 The Pennsylvania legislature responded by
passing an act "to provide for the organization and regulation of title
insurance companies."19
2. Structure of Modern Title Insurance
Since its birth in Philadelphia 114 years ago, title insurance has
grown into a multi-billion dollar industry and is the predominant
form of title assurance in the United States.' 94 Title insurance occu-
pies a unique position within the insurance industry for at least two
187. Id See Gandrud, supra note 184, at 5-6 (presenting an analysis of the case).
188. Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. at 161.
189. Id. at 166.
190. Id at 167.
191. See Gandrud, supra note 184, at 6.
192. See Roberts, supra note 185, at 6:
[T]his decision shocked the conscience of both the bench and bar in Phila-
delphia, revealing as it did a defect in the conveyancing system. That is,
absent recourse against the vendor on warranties, the vendee was forced to
suffer the entire loss should an adverse claimant appear.., after the yen-
dee's conveyancer had, in the exercise of due care, advised vendee that the
title was free and clear.
Id.
193. Gandrud, supra note 184, at 6.
194. See In re Ticor Title Insurance Company, Federal Trade Commission, Docket
No. 9190, Initial Opinion (December 22, 1986) (citing the 1983 calendar year earn-
ings for two of the largest title insurance companies representing 23.1 percent of the
national marketshare): Chicago Title reported gross income of approximately
$206,000,000 from title insurance premiums and $52,000,000 from other sources.
SAFECO earned approximately $163,000,000 from title insurance premiums and
$30,000,000 from other sources.
Various theories have been advanced to explain the rapid growth and popularity
of title insurance among institutional investors. Because these investors were doing
business on a national scale, they either had to know the reliability of thousands of
local conveyancers or had to run their own searches. Because both options were im-
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significant reasons. First, title insurance is based not on prophesy,
but on the search of a diligent abstractor of titles.'95 If a defect is
found in the records, it becomes the basis of an exception from cov-
erage written into the policy. 196 The title insurer is in the unique
position of being able to eliminate potential claims through its own
work.197 Second, a tide insurance policy is a single premium agree-
ment 98 to indemnify a policy holder for losses precipitated by both
on-record and off-record title defects. 199
"Title insurance, like other forms of insurance, is a contractual re-
lationship between an insured and an insurer." 200 All contractual
obligations of the insurer are set forth on the face of the policy.20 1
The policy itsel2o2 is divided into several parts. For the purposes of
this discussion, the two most important policy sections are: 1) Sched-
ule B; and 2) duty to defend.
practical, institutional investors began to demand title insurance as a condition to
their lending money on the security of the property. See Roberts, supra note 185, at 8.
195. In contrast to title insurance investigations, life or accident insurance is
based upon predictions of future events by an actuary or statistician. See D. BURKE,
supra note 162, at 22.
196. Id.
197. Id. A life insurance company knows with a high degree of certainty that
sooner or later it will have to pay the face amount of the policy. Id. at 22-23.
198. The single-premium provides coverage lasting indefinitely. Each time the
tract of real estate is sold, however, the new vendee must obtain his own title insur-
ance policy. Given the prevailing rate of $3.50 per thousand dollars coverage, the
costs of protection can be rationalized by spreading out the premium over the ex-
pected length of possession. See Roberts, supra note 185, at 5.
199. "On-record" defects are those that can be discovered through a search of
public record information. "Off-record" defects are not found in the public record
and cannot be discovered even through the most competent title search. These risks
include misfiling of a document by the recorder and the status of the parties execut-
ing the document (an alien, married person, and insolvent, for example). See D.
BURKE, supra note 162, at 22-23.
200. R. WERNER, TITLE INSURANCE: THE ]LAWYER'S EXPANDING ROLE 6 (1985).
201. Id. Most courts regard the relationship between the insurer and insured as
purely contractual in nature, thereby limiting insurer liability, and potential insured-
party liability to the policy's contractual terms. See Heyd v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.,
354 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Neb. 1984) (noting the courts' frequently repeated axiom that
"title insurance is a contract of indemnity"). But see Lawyer's Title Ins. v. Research
Loan & Inv. Corp., 361 F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 1966) (a minority view holding that a
title insurance policy also entails a professional title search, opinion and guarantee).
The Eighth Circuit position suggests that the insurer should be held to a negligence
standard.
202. There are two types of title policies: (1) owner's policy-protecting the owner
by guaranteeing the marketability of the title; and (2) mortgagee's policy-issued to
satisfy and protect the lender. There are two separate policies but the buyer pays for
both. See generally G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 163, at 227-40.
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Schedule B begins with a statement of general exceptions for risks
that are outside the traditional examination role for the title in-
surer.205 These exceptions are identical to the boiler-plate excep-
tions of an attorney title opinion.2 04 The title insurer will often
cover these risks upon request for an additional premium.
Also within Schedule B are the "special exceptions" unique to the
title being insured. These are the title defects identified through the
company's pre-insurance examination process. A prospective policy
holder is made aware of these special exceptions upon receipt of a
title commitment prior to the issuance of the title insurance pol-
icy. 2 0 5 Armed with the knowledge of these title defects, the commit-
ment-holder may secure insurance coverage in one of two ways. The
most obvious is the elimination of the defect. The purchaser of real
estate occupies a rather strong bargaining position prior to closing
and may be successful in compelling the seller to satisfy or correct
the defect in title. A second option is to convince the insurance com-
pany to insure over the defect. Title insurance companies are in the
business of issuing title policies. If the existence of a particular title
defect presents the insurer with a reasonable or nominal risk of loss,
the company may provide extended coverage by way of endorse-
ments or deletion of the general or special exceptions.206
b. Duty to Defend
One of the most important contributions of the title insurance pro-
gram is the company's contractual obligation to defend all adverse
claims against the insured's title.207 Pre-title insurance methods of
title assurance involved the services of either an attorney or an ab-
stractor. The work products of both the attorney and, after the
203. R. WERNER, supra note 200, at 6. Preceding Schedule B are the declarations
of the policy or "Schedule A." Schedule A lists the relevant policy information in-
cluding policy number, date, and dollar amount of the coverage. In addition, this
section recites the name of the insured, the interest in real estate covered by the
policy, and a description of the land. See G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 163, at
228-34 (showing a reproduced ALTA title insurance policy form).
204. These standard exceptions include: a) parties in possession; b) matters that
could be shown by an accurate survey; and c) mechanic's liens (secret liens for 120
days in Minnesota).
205. A "title commitment" is a promise by the insurance company to issue an
insurance policy based upon the exceptions listed in Schedule B. Once the commit-
ment is issued, the insurance company must deliver the described policy even if it
discovers a defect (a "wild deed," for example) prior to closing.
206. See generally Gralen, Title Insurance for Lawyers: Additional Coverages in Title Insur-
ance: The Lawyer's Expanding Role, at 142-84 (A publication of the Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law 1985) (discussing the issue of extended coverage
and endorsements in title insurance policies).
207. See generally D. BURKE, supra note 162, at 287-330.
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Muirhead decision, the abstractor, were evaluated under a negligence
standard.208 As a result, adverse claims against the purported fee
owner were defended only if negligence was alleged in the prepara-
tion of the abstract. In contrast, the title insurance policy admits all
potential liability on the face of the document. Moreover, title insur-
ance companies have a duty to defend even spurious claims against
the insured.209 A title insurance policy's promise to compensate the
insured for all losses not excepted in Schedule B210 coupled with the
covenant to defend all claims against the insured, provides the policy
holder and the real estate industry with stability and uniformity.
B. Environmental-Quality Insurance
Part I of this note discussed CERCLA and SARA and the legisla-
tive scheme for remedying the effects of hazardous waste sites.211
Part II examined the negative impact of Superfund legislation on the
nation's real estate, investment, and banking industries.212 One sec-
tion also discussed the role of the environmental consultant in real
estate transactions and offered a prophetic argument for holding the
consultant liable under CERCLA.213 Part III has thus far discussed
title assurance methods and the curative effects of title insurance on
real estate transactions. The remainder of the note will argue for the
creation of a title insurance type program for the environmental risks
inherent in all modem real estate transactions.
1. The Need for Change
Before discussing the nature of environmental-quality insurance, it
should first be mentioned why it is of importance. The 1980s taught
us that our current system of environmental cleanup and formula for
liability does not work. As we enter the 1990s, the question as to
what types of changes should be made remains unanswered. If any
lesson can be gleaned from the success of the title insurance industry
it is that careful investigations into potential real estate defects and a
broad apportionment of financial risk is both curative and economi-
cally successful.
The history of title insurance also suggests that the system is ripe
208. Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161 (1868). See supra notes 186-90 and accom-
panying text.
209. See, e.g., sample American Land Title Association (ALTA) title insurance pol-
icy, reproduced in G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 163, at 231 ("We will defend
your title in any court case that is based on a matter insured against by this policy.
We will pay the costs, attorney's fees, and expenses we incur in the defense.").
210. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 22-89 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 106-160 and accompanying text.
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for the implementation of an environmental-quality insurance pro-
gram. Today, any party about to become associated with real estate
in the United States must consider the potential liability under the
environmental statutes. To be involved with real estate and, at the
same time, fall outside of CERCLA's four broadly interpreted re-
sponsible party categories, rivals the miracle of the "loaves and
fishes."214 The only statutorily defined safe-harbor is reached
through the performance of a pre-purchase environmental audit. To
satisfy the "due diligence" requirement of the innocent landowner
exception,2 15 this audit almost always requires the services of an en-
vironmental consultant. Although the audit may absolve the real es-
tate participant from CERCLA liability,216 it will not solve all of the
problems discussed in part 11.217
It seems reasonably clear that the environmental consultant will
soon face liability in the courts. Although the rationale for CERCLA
liability offered above may border on the imaginative,218 the courts
have been quite creative in the past in their search for responsible
parties.219 It seems equally clear, however, that attempts to hold the
consultant liable under CERCLA will ultimately fail for public policy
reasons. To hold the consultant strictly liable as an "operator" of a
hazardous waste site will accomplish nothing more than drive engi-
neering firms out of the environmental consulting business. Future
consultant liability will be derived from a different source. The envi-
ronmental consultant, like the pre-1868 abstractor of titles, has not
been held liable to a negligence standard in the performance of envi-
ronmental audits. A likely explanation for this oversight is that the
courts have no means by which to measure their negligence. Neither
the legislature nor the EPA has promulgated an industry standard of
consultant performance or required competency. Once consultant
standards have been established, the courts will undoubtedly find ex-
amples of consultant negligence. Environmental-quality insurance
will be created, if not by a need to protect the insured, then by a
desire to protect the insurer, an environmental consulting firm,
against its legal liabilities.
2. The Nature of Environmental-Quality Insurance
The program must begin with a legislative act providing for the
214. Luke 9:10-17.
215. See supra notes 84-89.
216. The mere existence of an environmental audit does not, in and of itself, pre-
clude CERCLA liability. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
994 (D.N.J. 1988).
217. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 106-60 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., supra note 15 (providing examples of creative judicial interpretation).
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organization and regulation of environmental-quality insurance com-
panies.220 Environmental-quality insurance, like its title insurance
counterpart, would involve the issuance of an insurance policy prom-
ising that if the environmental quality of the real estate proved to be
other than as represented on the face of the policy, and if the insured
suffered any loss as a result of the difference, the insurer would reim-
burse the insured for that loss and any related legal expenses, up to
the face amount of the policy.221
The process would begin upon receipt of an application for insur-
ance from a prospective real estate purchaser. The insurance com-
pany would retain the services of an environmental consultant to
perform a pre-insurance environmental audit of the property. The
scope and complexity of the audit would be within the discretion of
the insurance company. However, since the company would be lia-
ble for any undiscovered toxic contaminants, the audit would un-
doubtedly be thorough; perhaps more thorough than currently
performed by environmental consultants. Any contamination dis-
covered on the property would be listed on a "commitment to in-
sure." The company would agree to insure the property with the
exception of the items listed in Schedule B on the insurance
commitment.
The pre-closing discovery of environmental contamination bene-
fits all parties to a real estate transaction. The potential buyer learns
of any environmental problems well in advance of the purchase. The
seller then has the option of cleaning up the site himself and con-
cluding the sale, or losing a buyer and ultimately being compelled by
the EPA to remedy the problem. The lender benefits in that the ac-
tual condition of the intended collateral is discovered before a mort-
gage is taken. Environmental-quality insurance would benefit the
environment by encouraging the pre-release discovery of hazardous
waste sites. If no contamination is found on a site and an environ-
mental-quality insurance policy is issued, the insurance company is
liable for the prompt cleanup of any contamination discovered sub-
sequent to the policy date.
CONCLUSION
It was Congress' original intent that the ultimate financial burden
of environmental cleanup come to rest upon those who created the
hazardous waste sites. However, recent case law is replete with ex-
amples of deep pocket defendants being held liable almost without
regard to whether or not it is reasonable to do so. This judicial
"witch-hunt" has brought fear and uncertainty into the real estate,
220. See Gandrud, supra note 184.
221. Cf. Rooney, supra note 162, at 610.
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investment, and banking industries and, at the same time, has failed
to replenish the Superfund coffers. A viable solution to the hazard-
ous waste problem lies in adopting an insurance program analogous
to title insurance. Environmental-quality insurance would be a self-
sustaining program encouraging the pre-release discovery of hazard-
ous waste and bringing certainty back to the real estate transaction.
The expansion of CERCLA liability cannot continue. During the
1980s, legal scholars asked: "Who will be next?" A more appropri-
ate question for the 1990s might be: "Who is left?"
Anthony J Nemo
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